The faults reproached for the SNCF and SNCF Réseau after the derailment of a train in 2013 were at the center of the debates from Monday to Thursday, before the Evry Criminal Court.
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Despite the technicality of the discussions, the exchanges hardened, in the courtroom of the Evry Criminal Court (Essonne), in this fourth week of the derailment of the Paris-Limoges train, July 12, 2013, At Brétigny-sur-Orge (Essonne) station, which has cost seven people and made several hundred injured. From Monday, 16 to Thursday, May 19, the faults criticized for the SNCF and SNCF Réseau (ex-Réseau Ferré de France) were at the heart of particularly lively debates.
While emphasizing failures “in the organization, control and realization of maintenance operations” on the section of the way concerned, the instructing magistrates have established a link between the absence of permanent speed limitation in the sector de Brétigny -sur -Orge and the catastrophe, caused by the turning of a clock – a metal piece – on a complex lane device called “double junction”.
While the train derailed at 137 km/h, the convoys were authorized, in July 2013, to circulate at 150 km/h on this very taken path. “There was no security problem with speed,” defended Alain ostruffe, legal representative of the SNCF, which appears, like SNCF Network and a ex-Cadre Cheminot, for “Involuntary homicides” and “involuntary injuries”.
“Several alerts”
“No expert advocated or imposed on Brétigny a restriction of speed of trains to cross these lane devices which required maintenance efforts. As long as the standards were respected, security was assured, argues Mr. ostrofet . Trains circulate daily at 140 km/h, 150 km/h on this type of device for decades: there is no generic risk to circulate on these devices at this speed. “
If an expert who came to the site twice in 2009 confirms that he has “noted alert” or deemed necessary to impose slowdowns, one of his ex-colleagues, Hervé Chapuis, former manager of the “Pôle expertise lane”, however, assures, at the helm, that if the speed had been reduced to “100 km/h between 2009 and 2013”, “we would not have had this accident and we would have avoided it”.
“There were several alerts in the sector in 2009, 2011, 2012 and I draw the alarm with an email sent in 2013 to my management. If I had been director of the establishment, I would have imposed a Limitation, because we would have limited efforts on a device that aged and required regular corrective interventions “, develops Mr. Chapuis.
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